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This paper is based on a critical comparative political economy perspective that 
seeks to explain interrelated variables, inconsistencies and potential disruptive 
effects of China's dramatic rise and entrance into the global political economy. 
Furthermore, the paper argues that one should in particular focus on the strategi-
cally political decision taken by the Chinese leadership to integrate China into 
the global political economy. During this process, they have allowed Chinese 
sovereignty, in the economic sphere at least, to become 'perforated', and thus 
increasing the number of actors in the policy sphere. However, any analysis 
of China's present overseas economic expansion and foreign policy interests 
must also consider Chinese realpolitik and the underlying forces that shape 
these interests. Due to this the present paper includes a security perspective 
on whether China's reliance on soft power is only a temporary phase on its 
way to gain regional cum global hegemony. The employed critical compara-
tive political economy perspective is based on an eclectic approach to East and 
Southeast Asian international relations, employing realism, liberalism and 
constructivism to analytically differentiate between the different dimensions 
of the system's modus vivendi. Based on this recognition the paper analyses 
the new geo-political and geo-economic strategic relationship between China 
and Southeast Asia. Is Chinese encroachment into Southeast Asia creating 
greater stability, does it jeopardize US interests and what is the impact on the 
regime-types, economic restructuring, and the state-civil society relationship?
Keywords: Globalisation, regionalism, bilateralism, diaspora, USA, China, Southeast 
Asia.
Introduction
Globalization is rapidly changing the overall structure of the interna-
tional division of labour with the shift of services and manufacturing 
from the old industrialized economies to the new emerging giants - the 
global ofﬁce platform in India and the global factory ﬂoor in China. This 
dislocation in production, services and manufacturing signiﬁes a chal-
lenge to the West but is also part and parcel of the inherent imbalances 
in the world economy. The question for international political economy 
is where and how countries like India and China ﬁt in? 
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One possible answer is that we are entering a new phase of capitalism 
characterized by a changing production pattern with a shift of economic 
gravity to the East with corresponding consequences for labour markets, 
wage levels and living standards in the West; another scenario is related 
to the substance of the re-emergence of protectionism and a repeat of the 
all-out tariff battles that led to the Great Depression in the 1930s. In short, 
and very signiﬁcantly, it is necessary to ask what the responses are of the 
old economies that are loosing out (Newsweek February 6, 2006)
In their seminal account 'China Awakes', Kristof and Wudunn noted: 
'Almost overnight China has changed' (1994: 9). Although their observa-
tions primarily focused on internal dynamics and social and political 
changes, this book revealed the contours of a new 'Asian miracle' based 
on the premises and earlier experiences of the developmental state as ex-
empliﬁed in the 'command capitalist' strategy in Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan. The new literature on China has concentrated on the country's 
ability and success to attract foreign investment and the accompanying 
high economic growth rates. China is rapidly ascending to the status of 
a new economic, as well as political and military power, both region-
ally and globally. The world's most populous nation of some 1.3 billion 
people is already the seventh largest economy in terms of GDP as well 
as the third-biggest trading nation after Germany and the US. China's 
booming economy attracted FDI worth more than $60 billion in 2004, 
making it the world's biggest FDI recipient. China's sharply growing 
exports also accumulated more than $700 billion in foreign reserves, the 
second-largest amount in the world after Japan's nearly $850 billion. In 
addition, total employment in China is estimated around 750 million, 
which is about one and a half times that of the whole of the OECD with 
enormous labour reserve in agriculture and the informal sector ready to 
migrate to the coastal areas if, or rather when, labour markets tighten.
Many of these issues are well covered in the academic literature, but 
what is really new, is the fact that Chinese enterprises themselves are 
now investing worldwide and across a broad range of economic activi-
ties, ranging from trading and banking, to manufacturing and natural 
resource exploitation. UNCTAD (2005) estimated that China's outward 
FDI amounted to almost 39 billion in 2004. These data indicate that 
China has become a global player with operations established in more 
than 160 countries. This has led many commentators to speculate about 
the impact of Chinese overseas involvement: 'President Hu Jintao spent 
more time in Latin America last year than President Bush. And China's 
vice president, Zeng Qinghong, spent more time in the region last month 
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than his US counterpart, Vice President Dick Cheney, over the past four 
years'(Miami Herald February 2, 2005 cf Landau 2005). 
While the Bush administration asked Congress to increase US in-
debtedness with an additional $81 billion in order to keep forces in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, China offered more than $50 billion in invest-
ment and credits to countries inside the traditional Monroe Doctrine's 
shield. That sum surpasses President Kennedy's well known $20 billion 
package for the decade of the Alliance for Progress in the 1960s. In 1975, 
Chinese trade with Latin America amounted to $200 million; in 2004, 
it had reached over $40 billion. China has become one of the foremost 
players in the era of globalization, which US leaders promoted without 
considering that China might avail itself of this opportunity to move 
into previously sacrosanct US spheres (Landau 2005).
At the same time, China's very rapid capital accumulation has brought 
a spectacular rise in its share of world GDP, nearly tripling from 5 
percent to 14 percent in a quarter of a century. China alone has made 
up for the collapsed output share of the ex-Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe and much of the downward drift in the share of Europe and 
Japan (Glyn 2005: 8).
China is using 'soft power' remedies to nurture 'alliances with many 
developing countries to solidify its position in the World Trade Organi-
zation, ﬂex its muscles on the world stage and act as a counterbalance to 
US power' (Chicago Tribune December 20, 2004 cf Landau 2005). This is 
also the case in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, where governments and 
business welcome Chinese investment and cooperation as an alterna-
tive to Washington's overwhelming obsession with security and 'hard 
power' related issues. 
It seems clear that the Chinese leadership attempts to increase its 
ability to attract and persuade the world community, regional groups 
and individual states to comply with its interests. In contrast the present 
strategy of the Bush administration is an extension of its ability to coerce 
as a means of implementing US foreign policy exclusively relying on 
military or economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of 
a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. Hard power remains 
crucial in a world of states trying to guard their independence and of 
non-state groups willing to turn to violence. 
The neo-conservatives who advise the president are making a major 
miscalculation: They focus too heavily on using military power to force 
other nations to do America's will, and they pay too little heed to our 
soft power. It is soft power that will help prevent terrorists from recruit-
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ing supporters from among the moderate majority. And it is soft power 
that will help us deal with critical global issues that require multilateral 
cooperation among states. And it is soft power that will help the US 
to deal with critical global issues that require multilateral cooperation 
among states. That is why it is so essential that America better under-
stands and applies soft power. (Nye 2004a; 2004b; 2003).
Thanks to an overly narrow focus on terrorism and a tendency to place 
bilateral ties above multilateral relationships, the United States is also 
losing its inﬂuence in Southeast Asia to China. China targets Southeast 
Asia as a region with a very assertive ASEAN policy. 
US security policies following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
have played a signiﬁcant role in its estrangement. However, the problem 
in fact goes back to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997, when the Clinton 
administration used its inﬂuence on the IMF to impose US business-
friendly solutions on the region.
 China's decision not to revalue its currency helped stabilize the 
regional economic order. Shortly after that, China, Japan and South 
Korea began holding annual discussions with Southeast Asia under the 
ASEAN-plus-three formula. In 1999, after China's accession to the WTO, 
ASEAN governments began to worry about the impact of Sino-US trade 
relations. As a result, China proposed a free trade agreement (FTA) with 
Southeast Asia, the framework for which was signed in 2002.
It seems that China will soon become ASEAN's second-largest trading 
partner and bilateral trade could reach US$200 billion by 2010. Road 
and dam building, consolidation of control over the South China Sea, 
trade and investment combined with overseas development aid (ODA) 
and military assistance, might eventually result in China's domination 
of Southeast Asia regardless of Beijing's intentions.
The question is whether we are watching a Chinese replay of the 
Japanese Flying Geese scheme with the moving of production plat-
forms, FDIs combined with ODA and other diplomatic remedies to the 
catching-up formation in a pattern similar to that of Japan and later 
East Asian NICs in the past decades. As a by-product of such a course, 
China will sooner or later replace the United States as the region's most 
important strategic partner.
Although the global contradictions and problems provide the overall 
context, the purpose of this contribution is devoted to provide insight 
into, and investigate how, these emerging tendencies in the region are 
spelled out in the triangular relationship between China and the United 
States in Southeast Asia.
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The approach of the paper relies on a critical comparative interna-
tional political economy perspective (Cox 1990; Evans & Stephens 1988a 
and 1988b; Strange 1994 & 1996) which seeks to explain the interrelated 
variables, inconsistencies and disruptive effects of China's dramatic rise 
and insertion into the global political economy, and the concomitant in-
crease of foreign debt in the United States and its obsession with security 
and terrorism, respectively. The focus then is broadened into one that 
not only takes the state alone into consideration but also realizes that: 
'Through conscious political decision, elements of the Chinese leader-
ship have chosen to integrate China – or at least, parts of China – into 
the global political economy. In the process, they have allowed Chinese 
sovereignty, in the economic sphere at least, to become 'perforated', and 
increased the number of actors in the policy sphere' (Breslin 2002: 34). 
However, any analysis of China's present overseas economic expansion 
and foreign policy interests, must also consider Chinese realpolitik and 
the underlying forces which shape these interests. It should especially 
include the fact that the state and local government authorities play a 
signiﬁcant role makes it imperative to focus on these factors which are 
unique to China. Therefore, this paper includes a security perspective 
on whether China's reliance on soft power is only a temporary phase 
on its way to regional cum global hegemony (Nye 2006). The critical 
comparative international political economy perspective is based on an 
eclectic approach to East and Southeast Asian international relations, 
employing realism, liberalism and constructivism to analytically differ-
entiate between the different dimensions of the system's modus vivendi 
(Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/02: 167-185).
Based on this recognition the paper analyses the new geo-political and 
geo-economic strategic relationship between China and Southeast Asia. 
Is Chinese encroachment into Southeast Asia creating greater stability, 
does it jeopardize US interests and what is the impact on the regime-
types, economic restructuring, and the state-civil society relationship?
From Fifth Column to Investor
China's strategic interest in Southeast Asia goes back centuries exerting 
suzerainty of the region. In more modern times, such as during the Cold 
War, the CCP supported insurgencies and communist governments 
across the region. After the US defeat in Indochina, Beijing became 
perceived as a direct threat in Vietnam in 1979, when Chinese troops 
crossed the Sino-Vietnamese border to 'teach Vietnam a lesson' over its 
invasion and occupation of neighbouring Cambodia.
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During the wave of national liberation struggles in Southeast Asia, the 
pro-American ruling classes facing strong local communist parties, such 
as in Indonesia and, revolutionary movements as in Thailand, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Burma, were receptive to the US policy which portrayed 
the communist regime in China as the source of the menace to these 
societies. Today, mutual perception and trust in Sino-ASEAN relations 
has become important for both sides (Twining 2005). Furthermore, this 
relationship has strengthened as a consequence 'of the post-Mao lead-
ership's acknowledgement of the ideological and political reliability of 
Singaporean-style authoritarianism as a worthwhile formula for its own 
reform process' (Hersh 1998:32).
Thus, the former hostilities have been turned into claims by Beijing 
that its growing inﬂuence in Asia threatens no-one and is to the mutual 
beneﬁt of all. Zheng Bijan, dean of the inﬂuential CCP School says that 
'If China does not provide economic opportunities for the region, it will 
lose the opportunity for a peaceful rise....This is by no means a bid for 
hegemony' (Brookings 2005).
Some US based observers see China's bilateral engagement with Asia 
as more political than economic. In a testimony to Congress, Assistant 
Secretary of State James Kelly claimed that the bilateral agreements mean 
little in economic terms, 'but they serve notice of how China is using its 
newly won economic power to expand its presence and political inﬂu-
ence among its southern neighbors' (Economy 2005). Such statements 
are intriguing as they conﬁrm a change in US policy towards China 
from a friendly competitor to a strategic rival.
China's renewed interest in bilateral engagement with Southeast 
Asia comes in several spates which will be touched upon in the follow-
ing. First and foremost, is the increase in development aid and trade 
volumes; second is the increase of FDI both inward and outward; third 
is related to China's need for oil, gas and other energy sources; and 
ﬁnally security, defence and diplomacy related matters which cannot 
be separated from the above. This strategy is embedded in a regional 
and multilateral umbrella which will be discussed in the second and 
third sections of the paper.
China's relation with ASEAN is affected by the way the state controls 
its insertion into the global division of labour and manages its growth 
and overseas expansion under a dual-trading regime of export promo-
tion and import substitution (Low 2003: 72). One analysis of the impact of 
Chinese exports on its Asian competitors shows that countries producing 
consumer goods based on low wages are increasingly suffering negative 
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consequences as China's share of world trade grows. Thailand, Cambodia 
or Laos are not able to compete with base wages as reported from Guang-
dong at about $80 per month and working hours up to 80 per week. The 
harsh discipline imposed on the Chinese working class and the fact that 
no independent unions exist translating in appalling working conditions 
makes it almost impossible for others to compete (Glyn 2005: 12-13). 
China's rapid strides in expanding its trade relations with South-
east Asia have been paralleled by the growth of its role as a source of 
regional investment. As it secures the resources necessary to fuel its 
growth, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are investing heav-
ily in mining, natural gas, and logging opportunities throughout the 
region. China has committed US$100 million in aid and investment to 
Myanmar and is actively extracting Indonesian natural gas, investing 
in infrastructure development in the Philippines, establishing rail and 
highway links with Cambodia, Thailand and Singapore, and promis-
ing to dredge part of the Mekong River in Laos and Myanmar to make 
it suitable for commercial navigation (Economy: 2005: 6). Also private 
Chinese companies are rapidly joining the SOEs in their search for new 
investment opportunities.
China tries to reassure its neighbours by claiming that its growing 
regional importance is a win-win situation for all. Nonetheless, some 
countries are seeing the beneﬁts moving largely one way. In Myanmar 
and Cambodia, newly signed deals with China are generating fears of 
economic dependence and political domination. A trade agreement with 
Thailand has beneﬁted China's exporters. The ﬁrst cries of complaint are 
being heard. 'China has found it relatively easy in recent years to build 
closer ties to its neighbours with rhetoric about nurturing an East Asian 
economic community', says David Shambaugh. 'But striking speciﬁc 
deals in speciﬁc areas to China's beneﬁt,' he contends, 'will drive a wedge 
into the diplomatic progress China has made'(Vatikiotis 2004a: 12).
ASEAN-China trade totalled US$ 39.5 billion and US$ 41.6 billion 
respectively in 2000 and 2001. ASEAN's share in China's foreign mer-
chandise trade has been continuously on the rise, increasing from 5.8 
percent in 1994 to 8.3 percent in 2000. China is now the sixth biggest 
trading partner of ASEAN (Tongzon 2005: 191). The two-way trade 
between China and ASEAN has been growing at a much faster pace 
than that between Japan and ASEAN in recent years. China-ASEAN 
trade topped $100 billion in 2004, and soared 25% in the ﬁrst half of 
2005 from a year earlier amid ongoing reductions in tariffs. ASEAN 
is now China's fourth-largest trading partner behind the European 
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Union, the US and Japan. China has already superseded the US as the 
biggest trading partner of Japan and South Korea. For ASEAN, the US 
and Japan are still the two biggest trading partners. It is just a matter of 
time before China will replace both as ASEAN's biggest trading partner 
(Masaki 2005).
In 2005, ASEAN became China's fourth-largest trading partner behind 
the European Union, the US and Japan. China has already superseded 
the US as the biggest trading partner of Japan and South Korea. It is just 
a matter of time before China will replace the US and Japan as ASEAN's 
biggest trading partner (Masaki 2005). China's export structure is similar 
in many respects to that of the ASEAN countries. The PRC is an export 
rival to its regional neighbours in both labour-intensive products and 
in goods with greater technological complexity. It is also a competitor 
in terms of its capacity to attract FDI, which can only increase at the 
expense of others. In competitive export capacity the PRC is a threat to 
Thailand and other Southeast Asian economies' market shares in the 
EU, US and Japan (Holst and Weiss 2005). More intense competition is, 
therefore, to be expected in third-country markets and ASEAN domes-
tic markets with the establishment of a FTA. China has the lowest unit 
labour cost and thus a comparative wage advantage in relation to the 
original ASEAN-6. Even with regard to productivity increase, China's 
output per worker is growing faster than that in the Philippines, Ma-
laysia and Indonesia (Tongzon 2005: 208). 
In smaller countries like Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, the economic 
imbalances in the two-way trade are even more apparent. Chinese ex-
ports to Myanmar in 2003 were valued to be as high as $900 million, 
compared with $170 million in exports from Myanmar into China. Laos 
absorbed Chinese goods valued at almost $90 million in 2003, more than 
double the 2002 ﬁgure. Laotian exports to China meanwhile, amounted 
to $8 million, a 15% increase (Vatikiotis 2004a: 12). 
The situation in Myanmar has clear similarities with Cambodia. 
China has supplied more than US$1.6 billion in arms to the country 
and continues to train a signiﬁcant number of its military. In March 
2004, Chinese vice-Premier Wu Yi was in Yangon to sign 24 pacts on 
economic and technical cooperation. The Chinese also gave Myanmar 
$200 million in low-interest loans. Myanmar's collaboration with China 
has become so close that some observers claim that Beijing now has a 
big say in domestic politics. Diplomatic sources say that a common 
complaint is that China is also dumping cheap goods and demanding 
special privileges for Chinese companies (Vatikiotis 2004b: 12). China 
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wants to secure stable oil and other energy supplies by land, as well 
as by sea. Speculation is rife about the idea of building an oil pipeline 
running across Myanmar to Kunming at an estimated cost of $2 billion 
(Masaki 2005). Beijing has a strategic interest and motive behind its 
dealings with the military junta. In this way, 'China has supplied about 
US$ two billion for armaments that have made the Burmese military, 
the second largest in Southeast Asia after Vietnam, much more techni-
cally sophisticated. It has helped the construction of roads, railroads, 
airﬁelds, ports, and dams….Equally important are unrecorded Chinese 
inﬂuences: Chinese investment – probably the largest of any foreign country 
– is not found in international statistics' (Frost 2004: 334).
In Cambodia, closer ties to Beijing are spawning economic, political 
and even military agreements that, some ofﬁcials fear, ties their country 
too closely to China. In November 2003, China and Cambodia signed 
a military agreement under which Beijing provides funds for military 
training as well as equipment. Cambodia also has accepted aid to help 
build a railway linking China's Yunnan province to the Cambodian 
seashore, a strategic priority for Beijing. China has lent Cambodia more 
than $45 million during the past two years, mostly on interest-free terms. 
For some Cambodians, China has gained a strategic foothold in the 
country at the expense of Cambodian autonomy and is geo-politically 
using Cambodia as a buffer against its old foe, Vietnam. 
China has also funded the 'North-South Corridor' project to build a 
highway linking Kunming and Bangkok via Laos. The highway is sched-
uled to be completely opened to trafﬁc in 2011. Japan balked at funding 
the project, partly out of fear of lending China a hand in increasing its 
inﬂuence southward on the Indochina peninsula. China also set up a 
special fund totalling $20 million within the ADB for poverty alleviation 
of the region in 2004 (Masaki 2005). 
As an economic, political and cultural power house, China has been 
adept at overtaking the US in what American political scientist Joseph 
Nye has dubbed the soft power approach in inﬂuencing foreign socie-
ties' public opinions, and achieve sympathy.
In a trade related issue, Thailand has asked for support from Beijing, 
which has promised to train more Thai Chinese language teachers, send 
native speakers to work in Thai schools, and provide free teaching ma-
terials. Whether this has implications for the Thai population's view of 
China is difﬁcult to discern, but according to one poll in 2003, 76 percent 
of Thais said that China was Thailand's closest friend as opposed to 9 
percent who named the United States (Vaughn 2005: 20).
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These ﬁgures imply that there is a clear strategic link between FDI, 
ODA, military support and a speciﬁc focus on export of cultural values.
China is already supporting language training in dozens of coun-
tries and reportedly has set a target of raising the number of foreigners 
studying Mandarin around the world to 100 million by 2010. Currently, 
more than 30 million people worldwide are studying Mandarin. Since 
2004, China's Education Ministry has opened cultural language cen-
tres called Confucius Institutes in over 20 countries. In 2004, 110,844 
foreigners from 178 countries were studying Mandarin in China, says 
Xinhua, up 43 percent on 2003. In Southeast Asia, private language 
schools in Malaysia and Indonesia report rising enrolment in Chinese 
classes (Montlake 2006). This will also have important spill-over effects 
on future trade and investment patterns.
Some observers argue that, dynamic economic growth will propel 
overseas investment in the ASEAN countries, rather than divert FDI 
from the region. 'China's rapid growth will result in a shift in compara-
tive advantage between the region and China....In the near future, China 
could well constitute the fourth wave of FDI for Southeast Asia…' (Wong 
and Chan 2003: 278-279). 
In a speciﬁc case, which illustrates these points, Chinese ﬁrms are 
reportedly aggressively grabbing local market shares for manufac-
tured items like motorcycles and other consumer products. A Chinese 
semi-state-owned enterprise TCL invested $ 10 million in Vietnam to 
manufacture colour TVs, and within three years edged out foreign ri-
vals - Sony and Samsung - to grab a 15 percent share of the Vietnamese 
market (Wong and Chan 2003: 297).
Furthermore, the region is host to a relatively big share of Chinese 
outward investment in non-trading activities. Although there is substan-
tial disagreement about the actual ﬁgures, China is now either the third 
or fourth biggest investor or rapidly climbing to become number one 
(Frost 2004). Thailand attracted the largest number of Chinese projects 
and garners the greatest share of investment (Wong and Chan 2003: 286). 
This rapidly growing ﬂow of outward direct investment from China is 
primarily state-owned capital, but private Chinese companies have also 
started to see beneﬁts of investing abroad. 
With a Chinese domestic market of 1.3 billion people and plenty of 
low-cost labour, it might be surprising to ﬁnd companies looking at 
investing offshore. Yet, as China grows and competition intensiﬁes, 
some companies are searching for new markets and try to develop 
global brands. They may also be aiming to escape regulatory barriers 
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and overcapacity at home and, in the most developed areas, higher land 
and labour costs. Besides with protectionism growing in the US and EU 
against Chinese exports, a foreign presence can be a clear advantage. 
Sluggish domestic demand and declining proﬁt margins have in some 
cases forced manufacturers such as the consumer-goods giant Haier, 
and the electronics heavyweights Changhong and Konka to establish 
production bases outside China (Vatiokakis 2004).
Beijing openly shows its desire to promote Chinese overseas invest-
ment. Premier Wen Jiabao told a business audience at an ASEAN summit 
in Bali in October 2003: 'The Chinese government will encourage more 
of its companies to make investment and establish their businesses in 
Asian countries' (Vatiokakis 2004). More than 100 Chinese business 
executives attended an investment forum held in conjunction with the 
Bali summit and another 40 companies went to an Asia Paciﬁc Economic 
Forum investment conference in Bangkok the same month. 
Despite Premier Wen Jiabao's encouragement, and China's accession 
to the WTO in late 2002, outward investment still requires ofﬁcial ap-
proval. Projects that exceed $30 million must go to the State Council, 
China's cabinet. From Beijing's point of view, lifting all barriers to 
overseas investment could risk a stampede with capital-rich companies 
bidding against each other for foreign assets, something that has already 
happened in the oil industry (Vatikiotis 2004a).
In the more recent past, the bulk of China's overseas investments went 
primarily to resource-based extraction like in oil and gas in Australia, 
Indonesia and Thailand. However, now Chinese manufacturers are 
scouting the region for production platforms to penetrate new markets. 
Chinese companies now supply Indonesia with electric-power plants 
and mobile-phone networks, and there are plans to build a 17-hectare 
China business centre in Jakarta. Chinese investors come to Thailand 
'to use the country as a gateway to the ASEAN market,' says BOI Sec-
retary-General Somphong Wanapha (Vatikiotis 2004a).
FDI ﬂows also create problems. While the growth of China hypo-
thetically can be a boon to the rest of the world in the long run, it can 
also be a cause for concern to Southeast Asia in the short and middle 
terms. When one considers the fact that China is now expected to 
capture 6.5 percent of the total FDI for the next ﬁve years, the ﬁght for 
the leftovers is even more severe. 'That is to say, 10 Southeast Asian 
countries have to compete for the remaining 23.5 percent of the FDI 
left by China - an average of little more than 2 percent for each coun-
try' (Beng 2002).
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 These features partly explain why FDI into Southeast Asia has been 
declining dramatically. In this context, it is easy to understand why 
ASEAN is now trying to develop a close relationship to China. In 2000, 
Southeast Asia received just $10 billion of foreign capital, a 37 percent 
decline from the $16 billion in 1999. The ﬁgure was $27 billion in 1996 
and $19 billion in 1998. China is the lone beneﬁciary of the global invest-
ment ﬂows while Southeast Asia both on individual country by country 
basis and as a region has been excluded as a major recipient of global 
FDI ﬂows (Beng 2002).
This situation means that the region found itself in a catch 22 situation 
in competing for a share of FDI. Globalization has now turned the world 
into a beauty contest where the most attractive country or region will 
stand to gain the most from the ﬂows of funds (Beng 2002). In other words, 
the region has entered the race-to-the-bottom which implies a decrease 
in regulation levels of labour relations, as well as an irreversible process 
that seeks to exert a downward pressure on welfare and social beneﬁts 
that are presumed to 'inhibit' the incentive to work (Schmidt 2006b). 
Indeed, the political establishments of Southeast Asia have to satisfy 
the expectations of international investors in as many areas as possible. 
Most notably, they have to strengthen the region's business outlook 
encompassing transparency, accountability and fair competition. Bar-
ring such efforts, FDI will continue to make its way into neighbouring 
and other regions, to the detriment of Southeast Asia. Capital goes to 
places where proﬁts can be guaranteed. Right now, unless ASEAN 
makes Southeast Asia better and safer than China, the ﬂows of future 
FDI will continue to go north.
It is interesting, in passim, to note with Callahan, that 'it is common 
to assume that Western multinational corporations are the main in-
vestors in China. But diasporic Chinese (including Taiwan and Hong 
Kong) account for around 80 percent of foreign direct investment in the 
PRC' and 'Thailand's CP Group is the largest foreign investor in China' 
(Callahan 2003: 491/500). This is important because although the bulk 
of outward investment from China remains state-driven, it is indeed 
plausible that some capital is recycled back through formal and informal 
diasporic networks.
Moving now to the pertinent issue of energy it has become clear that 
since 1993 China has become a net importer of crude oil. The Chinese 
economy is now the world's second-largest oil consumer, after the US. 
PRC already depends on imports for as much as 40% of its oil needs, 
nearly half of which comes from the Middle East. About 80 percent of 
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Chinese oil imports are shipped through the Malacca Strait, a water-
way notorious for piracy activities (Masaki 2005). Chinese investments 
in Indonesian oil, gas and power plants will certainly increase further 
under the Susilo Bambang Yudhyono administration. Jakarta needs 
FDI urgently and Beijing is promising to deliver. Sino-Indonesian ties 
have undeniably improved since the 1990 normalisation of relations. 
Resource and oil rich Indonesia is the most important state in the region 
for energy-deﬁcient China (Low 2003: 73). The recent signing of the 
Strategic Partnership Agreement between the two countries in Jakarta 
on April 24, 2005 is certainly an historical event.
Former President Megawati also focused on closer economic rela-
tions with China. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 
2002 which established an Indonesia-China Energy Forum. This was 
followed by PetroChina's moves to secure oil ﬁelds in Indonesia. Chi-
na's National Offshore Oil Corporation has also invested in Indonesia's 
energy sector. In 2002, Indonesia won a contract to supply liquid natural 
gas to China's Fujian Province. From 1992 to 2002 bilateral trade be-
tween Indonesia and China increased from $2 billion to $ 8 billion while 
Chinese investment in Indonesia has grown from $282 million in 1999 
to $6.8 billion in 2003. Despite growing economic ties, some analysts 
see Indonesia's desire to play a leading role within Southeast Asia as 
potentially creating a geo-political rivalry with China (Vaughn 2005: 
27). There is a possibility that the economic relationship may not deliver 
the beneﬁts to Indonesia that some have come to expect. In fact, 'most 
analysts agree that China's changing export proﬁle represents a serious 
threat to the future export competitiveness of most Southeast Asian 
countries.' According to Chia Siow Yue, 'the export overlap between 
China and Indonesia is 83 percent and the overlap between China and 
Singapore is 38 percent' (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett: 88).
Beijing seems intent in pursuing a more active diplomacy around 
its southern periphery in Southeast Asia, including using 'renminbi 
diplomacy' and defence co-operation. China's US$400 million loan to 
the Philippines for a rail link between Manila and the former US airbase 
Clark was a carrot for Manila to conclude a defence co-operation agree-
ment with China, although the Philippines remains an important ally of 
the United States. Manila has since signed an agreement to co-operate 
in joint oil and gas exploration in the disputed Spratley Islands in the 
South China Sea. In March 2005, the state-owned oil companies from 
China, Vietnam, and the Philippines signed a three-year deal to jointly 
search for oil and gas in the disputed area (Economy 2005: 8).
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During the bilateral quarrel between China and Singapore in 2004, 
there were rumours that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had offered 
to sell Chinese missiles to Malaysia, so as to calm the Malay majority's 
suspicions of China. Defence co-operation between Jakarta and Beijing 
has also been touted recently. In concrete terms, China has established 
a listening post in Myanmar; and in 2002, China signed its ﬁrst ever 
border agreement with Vietnam. The two countries also conducted a 
joint campaign to clear all the landmines along their border, resulting 
in an increase of border trade to $4 billion yuan (Economy: 2005: 7).
Between 1999 and 2000, China has succeeded in signing bilateral po-
litical agreements with all ASEAN countries that are aimed at boosting 
bilateral long-term cooperation in the new century. Moreover, Chinese 
leaders have made full use of their attendance at almost all multilateral 
forums, to conduct bilateral meetings with their ASEAN counterparts. 
For China, the relationship between multilateralism and bilateralism, 
thus, is a reciprocal one (Cheng-Chwee 2005). In all cases, Beijing has 
shown real panache and sophistication in dealing diplomatically with in-
dividual ASEAN countries, while promoting the much-touted ASEAN-
China FTA (to be in effect by 2010). It has even managed to implement a 
foreign policy relying on 'divided to rule' within ASEAN, as illustrated 
by the recent Sino-Singaporean spat in which Beijing openly favoured 
and courted Singapore's ASEAN partners, who seemed just as keen to 
be courted by the Chinese panda (Teo 2005).
Rivals in Regionalism - The New East Asian Community
Few major international relationships have changed so rapidly as the 
Chinese-ASEAN rapprochement. Today, all countries of the region em-
brace and acknowledge publicly the 'one-China' policy. This is to high 
degree a consequence of better Sino-ASEAN economic ties, but also 
implies that Taipei will be left with little room to carry out economic 
diplomacy with Southeast Asia' (Cheng-Chwee 2005: 113). China has 
shown a deﬁnite readiness to use its growing soft power, notably eco-
nomic leverage and national image and the beneﬁts that accrue from 
non-material, ideational and cultural inﬂuences as a persuasive means 
to translate its inﬂuence into concrete policy interests.
This also implies that ASEAN has witnessed a major conceptual change 
of its Northern neighbour, from what was termed a 'China threat' to one 
of a 'benign' China with opportunities. Three factors encouraged this 
evolution: 1) China's pragmatic policy of political stabilisation denotes a 
radical political shift in terms of appeasement; 2) the real catalyst was an 
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outcome of the ﬁnancial crisis with the Chinese leadership's decision not 
to devalue the renminbi and the later bonus of surplus trade, accorded to 
ASEAN countries by Beijing; and 3) The shift - or reduced threat-percep-
tion is also due to Beijing's new, active foreign policy and sophisticated 
diplomacy, based on the smooth internal transitions from Deng Xiaoping 
to the Jiang Zemin-Zhu Rongji team, and then to the present Hu Jintao-
Wen Jiabao team. Four areas of Beijing's present foreign policy sophistica-
tion would include a less pompous, but more pragmatic foreign policy; a 
growing economic diplomacy; a thrust towards international integration 
and ﬁnally, a struggle for multi-polarity in the world (Teo 2005).
Ofﬁcial relations between China and ASEAN began in July 1991 
when Beijing started attending the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Confer-
ence. This was followed by various cooperation and partnership 
agreements with ASEAN, including one on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation, one on the South China Sea, and another on Non-Tra-
ditional Security Issues (Beng 2003). Since July 1994, China has also 
become a full dialogue partner of ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF).
All these diplomatic partnership agreements help to assure the 
ASEAN-countries of a more benign China in its outlook and national 
strategy, and have reduced the previous perception. China is increas-
ingly being recognized not only as a benign power, but also as a respon-
sible actor on the world stage. The key to this policy change has been 
Beijing's move towards pragmatism, which can be observed in both 
China's domestic policies and external relations.
Southeast Asia appreciates the normalisation of China's new ap-
proach. This is encompassed in a greater sophistication of its foreign 
policy, and Beijing has deliberately redesigned its overall strategic en-
gagement with the region based on an active policy of strategic friend-
ship with ASEAN countries. 
Beijing's new security concept can also be interpreted as aiming at 
undermining US inﬂuence in Southeast Asia and loosen its alliances with 
Thailand and the Philippines. For example, in 1999, Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin warned ASEAN states against 'hegemonism and power 
politics' and 'gunboat diplomacy,' code words for the United States. 
China is not against playing power politics itself. Chinese inroads in 
Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia, through economic aid and military 
assistance, have become a cause of geo-strategic concern in Vietnam 
and India, which view China's presence in these countries as creating 
levers of inﬂuence (Thayer 2004: 181).
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Related to the soft power engagement in the region, China has taken 
a more active role in the ADB and was the prime mover in the estab-
lishment of the Boao Forum, the Asian version of Davos. All of these 
initiatives can be grouped under the rubric of China's new soft power 
security concept, 
which emphasizes cooperative (win-win) security, conﬁdence building, 
and multilateral engagement. The popularity China has garnered from 
these activities is no doubt also enhanced by the economic opportunities 
it presents to regional states. Yet, without China's active engagement of 
multilateral institutions, its growing bulk might provoke more fear than 
admiration, much as it did during the early and mid-1990s. Beijing's 
multilateral engagement has enabled it to improve its material position and 
its image simultaneously. The fact that this engagement furthers Chinese 
interests does not make it any less welcome in the region (Heginbotham 
and Twomey 2005: 246).
The smooth transition from Jiang-Zhu to Hu-Wen - despite the west-
ern critique of China's lack of human rights and democracy is considered 
as another plus by the ASEAN elites. The common impression in the 
region is that the new generation of Chinese leaders is taking a more 
business-like and pragmatic approach to foreign affairs.
In 1996, the Chinese leadership engaged a new security concept in an 
attempt to develop mutual trust and ties of common interest with the aim 
of promoting genuine security and create regional calm. In the aftermath 
of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, Beijing offered economic assistance to the 
worst hit economies. In fact, the ﬁnancial crisis contributed to a major 
foreign policy change towards a more active Chinese engagement with 
Asian multilateral security and regional organizations (Foot 2006: 85).
Moreover the crisis changed the regional perception of the US and 
EU's intentions. 'In this context, the Chinese prime minister Zhu Rongji 
declared in November 2000 that China stood 'ready to work with other 
East Asian countries for the reform of the current international ﬁnancial 
architecture', and was 'open to all ideas' about ﬁnancial cooperation in 
the region' (Sohn 2005: 495). 
China not only refrained from devaluing the renminbi but also provided 
a US$1 billion loan bailout of Thailand. Despite objections by the IMF and 
Washington, in June, 2003, 'China and 10 other Asia-Paciﬁc countries, 
including ﬁve ASEAN members, agreed to establish an Asian Bond Fund 
worth more than $1 billion to help bail out economies in crisis' (Economy: 
2005: 6). Soon after in December 2004 China implemented a second bond 
fund for another $2 billion to be invested in Asian currency-denominated 
government bonds. Indeed it is possible to argue that 
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The region – policy elite and wider community alike – perceived IMF policy 
throughout the late 1990s as humiliating and wrong. In the summer of 1997 
the IMF (and the US government) impeded the Japanese initiative to create 
an Asian liquidity fund. The Asian Monetary Fund (AMF as it would have 
been called) was explicitly to apply softer conditions than those of the IMF. 
The AMF's concept corresponded more to that of a 'lender of last resort' than 
the IMF. Essentially, the AMF idea was about providing unconditional loans 
to overcome liquidity crises (Dieter & Higgott 2003: 442).
These initiatives on ﬁnancial matters were taken in parallel with sev-
eral moves on the diplomatic front towards ASEAN. In November 2002, 
China signed two documents: a framework trade agreement designed 
to establish an ASEAN-China FTA by 2010, and also with ASEAN 
members, a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea, renouncing violent means of dealing with disputed sovereignty 
claims in these waters. In October 2003 it became the ﬁrst major Asian 
state outside ASEAN to sign up to the association's Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, the provisions of which likewise rule out the use of force 
for settling issues in dispute (Foot 2006: 85-86).
'China has expressed ... to work towards signing the Southeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapons-free Zone.' The agreement underscores the willingness of China to 
refrain from the use of force as an instrument of policy (Beng 2003). 
As Dieter and Higgott note 'what we are seeing is the contours of a new 
regionalism in Asia that exhibits three overlapping and complex trends':
1. An interest in monetary regionalism arising from the desire that 
has emerged, since the ﬁnancial crises of the late 1990s, to combat 
ﬁnancial volatility.
2. An interest in bilateral trade initiatives within the context of the 
wider multilateral system, largely at the expense of the US endorsed 
Asia Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) style of open regional-
ism of the 1990s.
3. The emergence of a regional voice beyond that of the sub-regions 
Southeast and Northeast Asia but more restricted than that of the 
Paciﬁc as a mega region. The voice of region in the global political 
economy that is emerging is a new one, an 'East Asian' one (Dieter 
& Higgott 2003: 446).
As a consequence, it is of interest to ask whether China is able to 
keep up its close ties with ASEAN and other regional partners. The 
following section argues that the main objective is to free itself from 
the encirclement of the United States. If China's history of foreign 
relations is taken into further account, Beijing's words can indeed be 
taken at face value (Beng 2003). Yet the outreach to Southeast Asia 
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is not entirely altruistic. It has been worked into the grand Chinese 
strategic calculation of how to cultivate a multipolar world, in which 
the US, the current hegemonic power, would loose its dominance. 
Similarly, China's diplomatic overtures to ASEAN can be interpreted 
as an attempt to pre-empt member-states from increasing their bilat-
eral security cooperation with the US. It is also a foreign policy goal to 
prevent Indonesia and Australia from further enhancing their military 
relationship following the signing of a security pact in 1995. 'To be 
sure, Beijing is trying to forge a diplomatic strategy to prevent other 
countries from 'uniting' against China by virtue of a perceived fear of 
a 'China threat', economic or otherwise. That said, the principal focus 
has been on countering the lengthening shadow of the United States 
on the region' (Beng 2003). 
This might have serious consequences for the creation of a new re-
gional entity, and not least on the Chinese rivalry with Japan for a lead-
ership role of the region. Although a lot of discussions and energy has 
been devoted as to whether the East Asian Community (EAC) should be 
seen as an alternative to the US-led APEC, or be more inclusive towards 
Canberra and Washington, Japan and China have been in constant 
rivalry about who should lead the process. This has placed ASEAN in 
the middle as the two nations have competed for increasing ties with 
ASEAN. Taken alone as individual countries, the 10 ASEAN members 
are much smaller than Japan and China, but they wield a strong voice 
in East Asia when acting as a collective (Masaki 2005). 
China has had the upper hand by taking a number of early concrete 
initiatives. In a geo-economic perspective, the Framework Agreement 
for Overall Economic Cooperation signed in November 2002 became the 
starting point for the creation of the world's biggest free trade zone with 
more than 1.8 billion people. Under that agreement, China and the old 
ASEAN members will put zero tariffs on most basic products by 2010. 
China and Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam will do the same by 
2015. A year after the China-ASEAN framework agreement, Japan and 
ASEAN signed the similar Framework for Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership in October 2003, starting the process of creating a free trade 
zone by 2012. Japan has already concluded a FTA with Singapore and 
reached basic FTA agreements separately with the Philippines, Malaysia 
and Thailand. Japan's FTA negotiations with Indonesia and the whole 
of ASEAN got under way in 2005 (Masaki 2005). 
In a geo-political perspective, China has taken a number of diplomatic 
initiatives as well. 
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These assertive and at times conﬂicting Chinese policies apparently reﬂect 
a desire to assuage the perception of China among some in ASEAN as the 
most serious security threat to their countries and thereby to forge closer ties 
with the grouping. Cementing ties with ASEAN in general - and the joint 
oil-exploration agreement with Vietnam and the Philippines in particular - is 
also seen by some as part of efforts to pre-empt a possible US-led containment 
of China (Masaki 2005). 
This illuminates the fact that geo-political concerns have important 
impacts on geo-economic problems such as the creation of an Asian 
Monetary Fund and/or the EAC. 
Beijing's new soft diplomacy, especially with regard to its Asian neigh-
bours, has evolved into a sophisticated and active soft power policy, and 
it has to be recognized that China is seeking or at least searching for a 
hegemonic role regionally, internationally, strategically and diplomati-
cally. Now Beijing's Asian neighbours are accommodating their Chinese 
companion, but their dreams may turn out to be different.
Understanding China's soft power diplomacy  
in Southeast Asia 
ASEAN has sought to restrain Chinese power by enmeshing it in re-
gional institutions. Whereas ASEAN is engaging China to tame the 
aggressive realpolitik that has characterised Chinese foreign relations, 
Beijing views the same institutions as a way to extend its regional inﬂu-
ence and has sought to exclude the US. In planning for the ﬁrst EAC 
summit, which was held in Malaysia, China tried to exclude India, 
Australia and New Zealand, but was overruled by Japan and ASEAN 
members. As China's regional inﬂuence grows, most ASEAN members 
are working to push against or balance Chinese power. While deepen-
ing trade and diplomatic co-operation with Beijing, many members, US 
allies such as Thailand and the Philippines, key 'swing states' such as 
Singapore, and emerging regional powers such as Indonesia, have also 
increased security ties with Washington (Twining 2005). 
The question is why the US has changed its policy in the region from 
a benign power to one almost squarely focusing on hard power balance 
issues including terrorism as the overall obsession. For Southeast Asia, 
long under the United States' political and economic inﬂuence, times are 
rapidly moving in a new direction. A decade ago about three-quarters 
of US investment in East Asia went to Southeast Asia. That ﬁgure has 
now fallen to 10 percent. Approximately 80 percent of US investment 
in East Asia now goes to China (Thayer 2004: 178).
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The United States remains the region's single biggest destination for 
exports, and will be for some years to come. This is probably why the 
White House is on the defensive in terms of coming to grasp with the 
regional and multilateral setting in East and Southeast Asia. As one 
observer remarks: ''Relations between Southeast Asia and the United 
States are perhaps best described as 'a policy without a strategy'' 
(Banloi 2003). 
Asian leaders are organizing and building new regional institutions 
precisely to avoid the sort of power politics that America is practic-
ing. Progress has been tenuous but real, and most regional leaders are 
cautiously optimistic about Asia's future. As long as this remains true, 
American emphasis on balance-of-power politics will continue to meet 
with only limited success. Indeed, this approach is likely to be under-
mined by regional players, who are more interested in participating 
in economic integration and building regional communities than in 
divisive balancing behaviour. Most troubling for the United States, it 
will also cede its leadership role in Asia and limit Washington's abil-
ity to inﬂuence the future shape of regional institutions in the region 
(Heginbotham and Twomey 2005: 243-244).
China's ultimate strategic purpose remains a subject of debate and 
speculation among analysts. Southeast Asia, in this respect, is the sole 
region adjacent to China in which Chinese inﬂuence can most easily 
expand. A benign interpretation would see China as simply cultivating 
the sort of stable, peaceful, and prosperous regional environment that 
is required for its own successful modernization. A more sceptical view 
sees China playing a long-term game designed to curtail American in-
ﬂuence and weave a close-knit economic and security community with 
China at the centre (Dalpino and Steinberg: 2003: 15).
Beijing is in fact using nationalism and the 'glories of the Chinese civi-
lisation' to instil a sense of unity among Chinese nationals domestically 
and among the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia. Although Beijing 
may acknowledge that rampant nationalism could pose a danger to its 
own internal stability, it has astutely harnessed it to build a new Asian 
pride and identity, which it hopes could help establish a new Asian sys-
tem of politics, economics, security and culture within the 'ASEAN+3' 
framework. The PRC ardently hopes this could be transformed ulti-
mately into an East Asian Community under its leadership (Teo 2005). 
To realize its peaceful rise, China is using a sophisticated blend of trade, 
conﬁdence building measures, and development assistance to establish 
itself as an important regional-cum-global leader.
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Of course the appeal of Confucianism offers Beijing a deﬁnite compar-
ative advantage in its soft power approach. Moreover, the relationship 
China enjoys with the Chinese Diaspora in the region, who dominate 
the economic and, in some countries like Thailand, increasingly the 
political scene, is another advantage. The immediate implications of 
such an approach are that it 
would be naive to believe that China is not interested in exerting a dominant 
inﬂuence over its regional hinterland; commercial and ﬁnancial muscle will 
eventually be the levers of choice, perhaps spearheaded by a strong regional 
currency. As much as the Chinese may be more ethnically exclusive than 
Americans and some Europeans, they are every bit as eager to see Chinese 
culture and traditions adopted by others - as a mark of civilization. As more 
and more Chinese tourists visit the region and even begin to dominate the 
tourist trade, the service sector response will be to tailor to Chinese taste 
and custom. This will inevitably result in a revival of Chinese culture and 
language in local communities once believed to have assimilated. Already 
one of the fastest growing Chinese language media groups is based in 
Malaysia, where Chinese language education has an unbroken history of 
more than a century. Up to the present, businesses have catered to a culture 
that projects modernity and sophistication in a Western guise - this could 
change and have an impact on U.S. and European inﬂuence (Vatikiotis 
2003: 75).
The use of culture as a tool of diplomacy highlights the sense of theatre 
that China skilfully deploys to exaggerate kin, ethnicity and national 
bonds between the Motherland and the Diaspora. It also 
reflects an increased appreciation by the Chinese government of the 
importance of norms and soft power in diplomacy. Chinese print media, 
television, music, food, and popular culture are spreading around the region 
as never before. So, too, are Chinese tourists fanning out across the region, 
often ﬁlling the void left by American tourists staying home after 9/11, 
the Bali bombing, and tsunami; 800,000 Chinese toured both Thailand and 
Singapore in 2004 (Shambaugh 2005).
In this way it is safe to say that ethnic Chinese business communities 
scattered in Southeast Asia have facilitated 'the rearticulation of mainland 
China into the global economy' not least through their reciprocal involve-
ment in more than 100,000 joint ventures in China (Yeung 2000: 267; 271). 
It is also arguable that the Chinese Diaspora has been used not 'just as a 
ﬁnancial resource in China to fund revolutions in the past and economic 
reforms in the present; they have been an important symbolic resource 
in the construction of Chinese nationalism' (Callahan 2003: 483).
The combination of geo-political and geo-economic strategies and 
cultural expansion begs an answer to the question: 'what are the impli-
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cations of China's policy of soft power for US inﬂuence in the region'? 
Elizabeth Economy notes the important point that, China's rise to date 
appears to be less about the 'inevitable conﬂict of rising power' theory, 
popular in some circles, than about creeping power transition. Chinese 
thinkers, themselves, have recognized that the international community 
is concerned by the potential implications of China's rise and have taken 
pains to ensure that it will be perceived as non-threatening. This is well 
illustrated by Li Junru, Vice-President of the Central Party School at the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who explicitly outlined the beneﬁts to 
China's neighbours, stating, 'China's rise will not damage the interests 
of other Asian countries. That is because as China rises, it provides a 
huge market for its neighbours. At the same time, the achievements of 
China's development will allow it to support the progress of others in 
the region' (2005: 3-4).
In order to comprehend the motives and objectives of Chinese prag-
matism, it is important to put both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic 
initiatives and foreign policy into the overall trade and security context 
and understand the internal and external constraints for a Chinese 
expansive strategy in Southeast Asia. The region as a whole maintains 
a trade surplus with China of US$8 billion annually, largely from its 
enormous exports of raw materials and precision machinery. China 
also agreed to an 'Early Harvest Package' that is perceived by ASEAN 
as 'largely a concession' to provide beneﬁts through tariff reductions on 
573 products including agricultural and manufactured goods. Individual 
Chinese entrepreneurs are also now expanding China's economic reach 
throughout Laos and Myanmar. In some areas, locals now use only the 
Yuan and speak Chinese (Economy: 2005: 4). The forays of Chinese 
companies ﬁt in with a broader strategic push by Beijing to establish 
closer economic cooperation with and among Asian countries. Unofﬁ-
cial reports by ASEAN ofﬁcials claim that the foreign policy aim is part 
of a broader thrust by China to deploy multilateralism against what it 
sees as US unilateralist hegemony in the region and the world. 'This is 
a long-term game that China is playing,' says a senior ASEAN ofﬁcial. 
'They want a situation in Southeast Asia that automatically takes into 
account China's interests. The whole objective of the policy is to avoid 
strategic encirclement by the U.S.' (Vatikiotis and Hiebert 2003).
Critical voices note that ASEAN's trade with Japan of $136 billion and 
that of the United States of more than $136 billion in 2004 exceeds trade 
with China. At the same time, in both Indonesia and Malaysia, people 
complain that jobs are being lost to China. Not least because Chinese 
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textile exports since January 2005 have increased, thus implying down-
ward competition for Cambodia and Vietnam. A growing mainland 
Chinese economic presence could also fuel latent resentment against 
the sizable ethnic Chinese economic elites in the region (Economy 2005: 
5). In fact, almost no research has so far been done to investigate the 
impact of China's FDI on labour markets, environment and social issues 
and the question is whether China is exporting its own poor labour 
practices (Frost 2004).
Factors inhibiting Chinese private investment and tourism are sen-
sitive to the treatment of Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia and in 
particular in the Philippines and Indonesia. The Indonesian racial riots 
in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis in 1998 which targeted ethnic Chi-
nese created long-term damage to the 'bamboo network' (Low 2003: 73). 
There are also cultural impediments when it comes to expansion as noted 
by a senior ASEAN ofﬁcial: 'Unlike Americans, Chinese don't embrace 
foreigners - you cannot 'become Chinese'' (Vatikiotis 2003: 75).
China's approach has been subtle, using soft power and economic 
diplomacy to build a benign multilateral framework in the shape of 
a free-trade agreement with ASEAN. 'China has shown a great deal 
of sensitivity,' says Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. 'China 
realizes that it is a huge elephant, and even if it treads softly, it can still 
shake the ground.' One observer notes that 'China is seen by some to be 
slowly ﬁlling the vacuum left behind by the United States in the politi-
cal, economic and security spheres in the region. This implies that 'U.S. 
Inﬂuence in Asia under Bush is Waning' (Agence France Presse, August 
29, 2004.) and being replaced by China.
Beijing has also stimulated the dynamics of regional cooperation in 
many other ways. One example is China's enthusiasm for developing 
the ASEAN-China dialogue into a vibrant web of multilevel and multi-
sector cooperation. As noted above, the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis was the main 
catalyst for the creation of a full-ﬂedged diplomatic mechanism spanning 
summit, ministerial, and senior ofﬁcial levels. As Cheng-Chwee notes, 
the mechanism has stretched into various semi-state and civil society 
organizations that include research departments, media outlets, youth 
organizations, and the business sector. Also cooperation in agriculture, 
transport infrastructure, as well as energy has been included. Over time, 
these ties have interwoven into a web of interdependence between China 
and ASEAN. The PRC has also taken the initiative in pushing for the 
creation of the Network of East Asia Think-Tanks (NEAT) (2005: 115). 
These moves are not merely tactical but part of PRCs overall goal to uti-
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lize the ASEAN-plus-three as the main vehicle of East Asian cooperation 
and the creation of the hybrid East Asian Community. Although there 
are other factors at play, China has played a decisive role in pushing in 
that direction. 'China's enthusiasm for East Asian cooperation is clearly 
driven by its aspiration to shape the direction of the existing regional 
institutions' (2005: 115-116).
Diplomatically, China's goals and vision in Southeast Asia are clear 
as it rivals the US and Japan world-wide and regionally. Moreover it 
may be again considering ASEAN as its own Monroe sphere, as it was 
during the 400 years of the Chinese tributary system under the Ming-
Qing Emperors. Southeast Asian countries appear to be accepting sub-
ordination as they seek to proﬁt from the rising China.
Conclusion
This paper has provided a detailed desk-study based on empirical 
evidence showing that China has a strategic interest in Southeast Asia. 
Beijing has engaged the region at all levels, bilaterally and multilaterally 
with individual states, and been at the forefront in the establishment of 
new regional institutions.
China has legitimate interests, both geo-economic and geo-strategic, 
not only in Southeast Asia, but also in East Asia in general. The Chinese 
leadership has shown a benevolent attitude in its dealing with regional 
organizations and the contrast between American power politics and 
Chinese soft power bilateral and multilateral engagement has helped 
shift world and regional perceptions of both the United States and China. 
It is interesting to note that a new Asian assertiveness has been brought 
to the fore, not least helped by active Chinese involvement.
Now that China's power has gradually grown, it has become impera-
tive for Beijing to get up to cultivate good ties to Southeast Asia. The 
most important side-effect of China's growth is the attendant siphon-
ing of critical FDI away from Southeast Asia. Under such conditions 
Beijing has to ensure that members of ASEAN remain closely bonded 
to China, not other stronger and richer powers. This is a sufﬁcient rea-
son for Beijing to support mainland Chinese outward investment into 
the region and even relocation of production platforms and industries. 
China's manufacturing prowess is also displacing that of Southeast 
Asia, indeed, even Japan. This is another reason why Beijing is actively 
supporting and cultivating increased volumes of trade and providing 
much needed ODA to poorer Southeast Asian states. Given such ﬁgures, 
coupled with the possibility that China might dominate the entire mass 
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manufacturing spectrum, hence leaving little room for Southeast Asia to 
innovate, it is little wonder that China is trying its best to ensure good 
ties with Southeast Asia. The forward looking and inclusive character 
of China's foreign policy is underlined through Beijing's active and 
repeated assurance that the relevance of the project is less important 
for China's own interest as it is for 'the sake of the creation of a region 
structure' (Dieter 2000: 22; Schmidt 2006a).
Beijing's relation to Asia is also a function of the American geo-eco-
nomic and geo-strategic current hegemony in world affairs. Having 
observed the relative facility of US military operations conducted in the 
Persian Gulf and especially in the Balkans and Iraq, it can be observed 
that neither prospective adversaries nor international organizations 
pose much of a constraint on Washington and Pentagon's behaviour. 
By cultivating ties with ASEAN, China can potentially put a check on 
US inﬂuence and accessibility to Southeast Asia.
In a more systematic manner this contribution has shown that bilateral 
geo-strategic ties at the formal level have deepened in terms of substan-
tial increases in development aid, likewise the trade volume between 
China and individual Southeast Asian countries will soon surpass trade 
with Japan, the NICs, the EU and the United States. The same can be 
said about Chinese FDI pouring into the region's economies. Indeed 
China is following in the footsteps of Japan and later NICs in pursuing a 
diplomacy and economic policy based on soft power and a Listian neo-
mercantilist strategy. In reality, China's diplomatic offensive started in 
the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis in 1997 and has since then been based on a 
sophisticated strategy enhancing China's security and defence needs and 
can best be conceptualized as an attempt to break the US encirclement of 
mainland China. This also explains its rather successful push to create 
new regional institutions and its outright strategy of establishing a new 
Asian identity. It is probably only a matter of time before the AMF - an 
alternative institution to the IMF - will be formally initiated. The East 
Asian Community is still in an embryonic stage, but also in this case it 
will most probably emerge as a real alternative regional institution to 
the EU, NAFTA and other types of regional organizations. The myriad 
of Free Trade areas, agreements and measures are, it seems part of a 
grand design to create a new East Asian entity.
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt is Associate Professor at Research Center on 
Development and International Relations, Aalborg University (jds@ihis.aau.dk)
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